Ensuring States Can Protect Student Loan Borrowers
Rescind and Replace the 2018 Notice of Interpretation

On March 18, 2018, the Department issued a Notice of Interpretation ("Notice") in the Federal Register regarding the preemption of state laws as applied to student loan servicing companies. The Notice, promulgated at the advice and suggestion of the student loan servicing industry, interpreted the Higher Education Act ("HEA") and federal law to limit the role of state consumer protection laws, regulations, and oversight over student loan servicing companies. Under the interpretation advanced by Secretary DeVos in the Notice, if a student loan servicing company provides affirmatively false information to a borrower, that borrower is without judicial recourse. Similarly, under the Notice, a state Attorney General is preempted from bringing a state law enforcement action against a servicing company if that servicing company acts deceptively, unfairly, untruthfully, or otherwise violates state consumer protection laws. Finally, under the Notice, state laws that "impose requirements" on servicers (through state law licensing, registration, or supervision regimes) "may conflict with legal, regulatory, and contractual requirements," and are therefore preempted. This Notice was widely rebuked by a bi-partisan group of state Attorneys General, the National Governors Association, and consumer-protection advocacy organizations.

We propose that the Department immediately revoke the Notice and issue revised interpretations (one on state consumer protection laws; one on state regulations and oversight) after an opportunity for public comment.

Background and Current State:
The Notice has been raised in litigation and has been relied upon by student loan servicing companies seeking to avoid liability in attorney general enforcement actions and consumer class actions. The Notice has also been relied upon by industry organizations seeking to invalidate state efforts to regulate the student loan servicing industry, and by student loan servicing companies seeking to avoid oversight by state regulators and licensors.

The Notice has been widely and expressly rejected as unpersuasive, and federal courts have refused to defer to the Notice or adopt the interpretations stated therein. And in other cases that post-date the Notice, courts have rejected the interpretation contained in the Notice, albeit without expressly opining on the persuasive value of the interpretation.

Indeed, we are aware of only two federal court opinions that squarely adopted the position espoused in the Notice, both of which have now been vacated by respective U.S. Courts of Appeal.

Proposed Action:
Immediately publish a statement in the Federal Register withdrawing the Notice, in light of both the policy expressed in the Notice and its wide rejection by federal courts, and establishing a 30-day comment period for interested members of the public to comment on the preemptive effect of the HEA vis-à-vis student loan
servicing companies. The withdrawal notice and request for comments should recognize, discuss, and seek comment upon: (a) the salient legislative history of 20 U.S.C. § 1098g, and its connection to the Truth in Lending Act; (b) the court opinions discussing the preemption issue, see supra; (c) the 2018 Notice of Interpretation, other Departmental pronouncements on preemption,9 and judicial opinions discussing those pronouncements. After reviewing submitted comments, absent compelling evidence to the contrary, the Department should quickly publish two separate notices of interpretation: one regarding state regulation of affirmative misstatements and material omissions, and one regarding state regulation, licensing, or monitoring of loan servicer operations.

State laws requiring licensing or registration regulation of student loan servicing companies that contract with the federal government

The second notice can address the role of state law in regulating and/or licensing student loan servicing companies. We believe the precise preemptive scope of the HEA in this regard to be a more nuanced question than would be addressed in the first notice. Indeed, the Department must take seriously the opinions of two district courts that have held that state law licensing regimes can create “duplicative and additional” requirements for loan servicing companies and therefore can be seen as “second-guessing the federal government’s decisions to contract” with the servicers. SLSA, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 62; Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Perez, No. 3:18-CV-1114 (MPS), 2020 WL 2079634, at *9 (D. Conn. Apr. 30, 2020) (hereinafter “PHEAA v. Perez”). In both of these cases, the courts have held that federalism principles bar state licensing regimes because such regimes could give a state agency “virtual power of review over the federal [contracting] determination.” SLSA, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 62 (citing, inter alia, Leslie Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas, 352 U.S. 187, 190 (1956)); PHEAA v. Perez, 2020 WL 2079634, at *9 (same).

As it relates to state law licensing regimes (as distinct from registration or supervision regimes, or document demands), the formulation expressed in SLSA and PHEAA v. Perez appears likely to win the day—i.e. a state cannot functionally veto the use of a contractor selected by the federal government to perform activities in that state. But state law can still require registration and supervision of the student loan servicing companies and enforce compliance with state laws that do not conflict with federal obligations and limitations. Courts may also look favorably on state licensing regimes that grant licenses as a matter of course to federal contractors acting in their capacity as such. And, as the Nelson and Lawson-Ross courts have made clear, state consumer protection laws regarding affirmative misrepresentations are not preempted. Thus, even if certain licensing regimes are preempted, state investigations into violations of state consumer protection laws are not preempted insofar as the underlying law is not preempted. We suggest that the Department work within that structure—rather than try and avoid the Student Loan Servicing Alliance and PHEAA v. Perez holdings—in order to draft a new interpretation that continues to give state regulatory agencies appropriate authorities to protect the interests of student loan borrowers.10
Endnotes


5 See, e.g., Nelson v. Great Lakes Educ. Loan Servs., Inc., 928 F.3d 639, 651 (7th Cir. 2019) ("We also agree that the Preemption Notice is not persuasive because it is not particularly thorough and it 'represents a stark, unexplained change' in the Department's position."); Lawson-Ross v. Great Lakes Higher Educ., 955 F.3d 808, 921 n.13 (11th Cir. Apr. 10, 2020) (finding the notice "unpersuasive"). See also, e.g., Hyland v. Navient Corp., No. 18CV9031(DLC), 2019 WL 2918238, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2019) (agreeing with Nelson); Pennsylvania v. Navient Corp., 354 F. Supp. 3d 529, 552 (M.D. Pa. 2019) (declining to defer to the Notice) aff'd 967 F.3d 273 (3rd Cir. 2020); Student Loan Servicing All. v. District of Columbia, 351 F. Supp. 3d 26, 50 (D.D.C. 2018) (hereinafter "SLSA") (finding that the notice is "unpersuasive guidance" in part because it "represents a stark, unexplained change in the DOE's position"); id. at 70 (noting that the Notice is due "no deference whatsoever"); People of the State of New York v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, No. 19 Civ. 9155 (ER), 2020 WL 2097640, at *17 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2020) (hereinafter "NY v. PHEAA") (agreeing with "nearly every other court to have considered the Preemption Notice: it is entitled to little weight," and acknowledging that the "only" decision to find the Notice persuasive was vacated by the Eleventh Circuit in Lawson-Ross); Reavis v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 2020 WL 3969887, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 2020) (declining to defer).


The now-vacated district court opinion in Nelson pre-dates the Notice. The Notice, meanwhile, was published shortly after the district court issued its decision, but before that decision was vacated, and expressly relies on that now-vacated opinion.

The Southern District of New York recently took a nuanced approach to preemption. See NY v. PHEAA, 2020 WL 2097640, at *15–16. In that case, the State of New York had made a series of claims regarding PHEAA's servicing of federal student loans. After concluding that PHEAA was not entitled to so-called "Yearsley immunity" (i.e., derivative sovereign immunity) or intergovernmental immunity, the court turned to issues of preemption. First, as noted above, the court declined to defer to the Notice. Id. at *17 n.14. Second, with respect to most of the claims in the case, the court agreed with the courts of appeal in Nelson and Lawson-Ross that state law claims for affirmative misrepresentations were not preempted by 20 U.S.C. § 1089g. Id. at *15. Third, however, the court concluded that claims premised on an allegation that PHEAA "steered" borrowers into less favorable repayment options, such as, for example, forbearance, were preempted under § 1089g. This holding, however, appears to be rooted in the specifics of how the claim was alleged—i.e., that a steering claim was about what borrowers were "told" about repayment options and/or that PHEAA "misrepresents the options . . . by often failing to mention the option to enter [income driven repayment]" instead of forbearance. Id. Perhaps recognizing the limited nature of its holding, the Court also expressly noted that it did "not find that amendment would be futile" and permitted NY, "if it so chooses, to replead the claims dismissed here." Id. at *16. The PHEAA v. NY holding, therefore, is entirely consistent with both Nelson and Lawson-Ross, i.e., that if the HEA mandates certain disclosures, and the state law claim is premised on—and alleged in terms of a—failure to make such a disclosure, such a claim is a preempted state law "disclosure requirement" under 20 U.S.C. § 1089g.

8 Section 1089g was codified in the same provision in which Congress exempted federal student loans from the disclosure requirements of the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") and state disclosure requirements. Pub. L. 97-320, § 701, 96 Stat. 1536 (1982). Section 701(a) of Pub. L. 97-320 exempted HEA Title IV loans from coverage under TILA, while § 701(b) provided that "Loans made, insured, or guaranteed pursuant to a program authorized by title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 . . . shall not be subject to any disclosure requirements of any State law." Pub. L. 97-320, § 701, 96 Stat. 1538.

At the time, TILA and its implementing regulations required a creditor to make certain disclosures for each transaction, including the creditor's identity, the amount being financed, any finance charges, the annual percentage rate, any variable rate, the payment schedule, the total amount of payments to be made, any demand features, and additional information about prepayment, late payments, and assumption. See Truth in Lending, Revised Regulation Z, 46 Fed. Reg. 20,848, 20,902-03 (April 7, 1981) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 226.18, effective April 1, 1981).

Congress was concerned about lenders and servicers being required to provide duplicative disclosures, since TILA's coverage overlapped with comparable disclosures required under the HEA for federal student loans. See S. Rep. 97-536, at 42, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3054, 3096.

When Congress § 701 was enacted, TILA permitted states to apply to the Federal Reserve Board ("Board") for a determination of whether a state law disclosure is "substantially the same in meaning as disclosure required under this subchapter." 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a)(2) (1982). If the Board determined that the state-required disclosure was substantially the same in meaning as a disclosure required by TILA, "then creditors located in the same state may make such disclosure in compliance with such State law in lieu of the disclosures required by TILA; id.; see also 12 C.F.R. § 226.29 (1982). Accordingly, if Congress had stopped at § 701(a), and had not adopted § 701(b), now codified as § 1089g, creditors in states that had adopted disclosures approved by the Board as substantially the same as those in TILA would likely have been subject to both the state law disclosure requirements and the HEA disclosures, resulting in precisely the confusion and duplication the legislative history indicates Congress sought to avoid.

There are several indications that Congress was concerned about overlapping disclosures when it enacted § 1089g. For example, during the legislative process, one senator stated that "[s]ome 23 States have enacted their own truth-in-lending provisions, as is true with respect to the Federal [TILA]. State disclosure laws serve no useful purpose in connection with loans made under title IV of the Higher Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1089g."
Act of 1965. It is therefore appropriate that the proposed exemption apply as well to State laws.” 97 Cong. Rec. 19,897, 19,916 (daily ed. Aug. 9, 1982) (statement of Sen. Heinz). Further, the civil liability provision in TILA authorizes liability for failure to comply with state law “disclosure requirements” that have been determined to be “substantially the same” as those imposed by TILA, 15 U.S.C. § 1640, adding to the inference that “disclosure requirements” in § 1098g similarly meant to refer only to state truth-in-lending act requirements.

9 Prior to the issuance of the Notice, the Department had generally affirmed the role of state consumer protection laws. For example, as recently as 2016, the Department’s Office of General Counsel explained that “the Department does not believe that the State’s regulation of [loan servicers or private collection agencies] would be preempted by Federal law.” Letter of Vanessa A. Burton to Jedd Bellman, Assistant Commissioner, Maryland Dep’t of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation at 2 (Jan. 21, 2016), https://goo.gl/JtKB3e. Moreover, in a Statement of Interest filed in Sanchez v. ASA College, Inc., No. 14-5006, 2015 WL 3540836 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2015), “the United States declared that ‘[n]othing in the HEA or its legislative history even suggests that the HEA should be read to preempt or displace state or federal laws. Nor is there anything in the HEA or the regulations promulgated thereunder to evince any intent of Congress or [ED] that the HEA or its regulations establish an exclusive administrative review process of student claims brought under state or federal law, even if the conduct alleged may separately constitute an HEA violation.” SLSA, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 50 (quoting the Statement of Interest).

In addition, in 1990, the Department issued a Notice of Interpretation regarding the preemptive scope of regulations setting out the steps that entities collecting student loans guaranteed by the federal government must take to attempt to collect defaulted student loans (“GSL Notice”). Notice of Interpretation: Stafford Loan, Supplemental Loans for Students, PLUS, and Consolidation Loan Programs, 55 Fed. Reg. 40,120 (Oct. 1, 1990). In the GSL Notice, the Department expressly “stressed[d] the limited nature of this action in displacing State rules and authority,” stating, consistent with the views espoused in 2015 and 2016, that “the preemptive effect of [the GSL] regulations extended no farther than is reasonably necessary to achieve an effective minimum standard of collection action.” 55 Fed. Reg. at 40,121.

Even further, a 2015 amicus brief submitted to the Seventh Circuit, the Department took the “opportunity to make clear that the [HEA] does not preempt breach-of-contract claims that are premised on violations of the Act,” Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, Bible v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., Case No. 14-1806, 2015 WL 3403631 (7th Cir. May 21, 2015). These statements are consistent with how the Department has viewed preemption of claims against other actors involved in the Title IV programs. CT, Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,832, 66,865 (Oct. 29, 2010) (“States should retain the primary role and responsibility for student consumer protection against fraudulent or abusive practices by some postsecondary institutions.”).

This is not to say that the Department has been uniform and absolute. Indeed, in its briefs in the district court and Ninth Circuit in Chae v. SLM Corp., 593 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2010), the Department asserted that certain of the claims were preempted by federal law. But in Chae, as the Eleventh Circuit summarized in the Lawson-Ross case, the claims at issue challenged how the servicer communicated information that the HEA required it to disclose. Thus, the pronouncements with respect to the claims at issue in Chae were fundamentally different than the sorts of claims being made now against student loan servicing companies. See, e.g., NY v. PHEAA, 2020 WL 2097640 at *16 n.13 (“Where two different appellate courts and one court in this District have noted, Chae concerned disclosures that were compelled by federal law and were disclosed in a manner that comported with federal law, and therefore the Ninth Circuit found that plaintiffs were simply seeking to impose additional disclosure requirements.”). Additionally, as noted infra, shortly after the issuance of the Notice, on March 26, 2018, the Department’s Office of the General Counsel cited the Notice to support its position that “[s]tate laws regulating Direct Loan servicing are preempted by Federal law.” See Letter from S. Dawn Scaniffe, Dep’t of Educ. Office of Gen. Counsel to Carmen Costa, Director, Consumer Credit Division, Connecticut Department of Banking (March 26, 2018) (filed in PHEAA v. Perez, No. 3:18-cv-01114 (D. Conn. Dec. 19, 2019) at Dkt. 67-14.

10 PHEAA v. Perez highlights a separate issue that merits consideration. Prior to the litigation, the Department maintained that PHEAA could not provide CT DOB with the requested records because of the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. One exception to the restrictions under the Privacy Act is known as the “routine use” exception, which is defined as “the use of [a] record for a purpose which is compatible with the purpose for which it was collected.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7). Each agency that maintains records in a “system of records” must publish in the Federal Register a notice regarding its system of records (known as a “system of records notice” or “SORN”), which specifies “each routine use of the records contained in the system, including the categories of users and purpose of such use.” Id. § 552a(e)(4).

The Department claimed that the CT DOB request was not subject to the “routine use exception.” Although the SORN at issue in PHEAA v. Perez was published by the Department in September 2016, the Department revised the SORN in June 2018. See Notice of a Modified System of Records, Privacy Act of 1974, 83 Fed. Reg. 27,587 (June 13, 2018). As part of the process of revisiting the preemption issues discussed above, the Department should separately consider changes to the SORN and servicing contracts to ensure that state regulatory and law enforcement agencies have sufficient access to information. See generally PHEAA v. Perez, 2020 WL 2079634, at *12–*13 (same).