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15	Attorneys for Defendant University of Sout	hern California
16	UNITED STATES I	DISTRICT COURT
17	CENTRAL DISTRIC	CT OF CALIFORNIA
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19		O N 222 00046 CDC MAD
20	IOLA FAVELL, SUE ZARNOWSKI, and) MARIAH CUMMINGS, on behalf of	
21	themselves and all others similarly () situated,	Judge: Hon. Sherilyn Peace Garnett
22	Plaintiffs,	DEFENDANT UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA'S
23	vs.	NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS
24	UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN	Date: _May 31, 2023
25	CALIFORNIA and 2U, INC.,	Time: 1:30 p.m. Ctrm: 5C
	Defendants.	Complaint filed: December 20, 2022
26	}	First Amended Complaint filed:
27)	March 29, 2023
28		

MOTION AND NOTICE OF MOTION

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on May 31, 2023, at 1:30 p.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard, in Courtroom 5C of the First Street Courthouse, located at 350 West 1st Street, Los Angeles, California, 90012, Defendant University of Southern California ("USC") will, and hereby does, move the Court for an order dismissing the claim asserted against USC in Plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

This motion is based on this Notice of Motion, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the pleadings, and such argument as the Court may allow.

This motion is made following the videoconference of counsel under L.R. 7-3, which took place on March 1, 2023.

Dated: April 17, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

SHOOK HARDY & BACON L.L.P.

By: /s/ Michael L. Mallow

Attorney for Defendant University of Southern California

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Iola Favell, Sue Zarnowski, and Mariah Cummings bring this putative class action against USC based on their alleged reliance on U.S. News and World Report's ("U.S. News") subjective annual school rankings. Plaintiffs, who graduated from a fully online degree program in the USC Rossier School of Education ("Rossier"), claim that they were harmed because Rossier's high rankings on U.S. News's annual list of "Best Graduate Schools of Education" were allegedly inflated in part by Rossier's misreporting of data to U.S. News.

Of course, any alleged inaccuracy in Rossier's high U.S. News rankings could not and did not impact the education and career preparation that Plaintiffs received at Rossier or harm their post-graduation career prospects—and Plaintiffs do not attempt to allege as much. Plaintiffs also acknowledge U.S. News issues a separate annual list of "Best Online Education Programs" that is specifically applicable to the types of programs attended by Plaintiffs. Nevertheless, based on Rossier's allegedly inflated rankings in U.S. News's Best Graduate Schools of Education—and nothing else—Plaintiffs allege they overpaid to attend Rossier's online programs and did not receive the benefit for which they bargained. Plaintiffs assert a single claim against USC under California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA").

For any or all of the following separate and independent reasons, Plaintiffs' claim should be dismissed, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted:

Plaintiffs' original Complaint also included equitable claims for restitution and injunctive relief. USC moved to dismiss the restitution claims on the basis that Plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law, *i.e.*, this Court lacks equitable jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' restitution claims. Doc. 30, p. 15-16. USC separately moved to dismiss the injunctive claims as moot. *Id.* at p. 16-17. In response, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed *all* of their equitable claims, including the injunctive claims that USC moved to dismiss only on the basis of mootness. *See* First Amended Complaint, ¶ 20.

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- Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the "reasonable consumer" standard. The rankings by U.S. News (as well as displays of such) are quintessential non-actionable opinions or puffery and, further, the target consumers (college graduates)—acting reasonably under the circumstances—would not place undue importance on the rankings.
- Plaintiffs fail to plead an economic injury-in-fact necessary for statutory standing under the CLRA because their alleged injury of overpayment is speculative, conclusory, and unsupported, in terms of both the bargain and the lost benefit, and also contrary to common sense because Plaintiffs received exactly what they paid for, i.e., a USC education.
- Plaintiffs' claim is barred by the educational malpractice doctrine in that 3. they seek to have this Court make a judgment about the quality or value of the education they received from Rossier.²

BACKGROUND

I. The Rankings

According to Plaintiffs, Rossier was ranked #38 in U.S. News's 2009 rankings of Best Graduate Schools of Education, but then rapidly rose in those annual rankings (to a high point of #10 in the 2018 rankings) because USC allegedly started misreporting "student selectivity" data. (First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), ¶¶ 3, 57, 58). Rossier withdrew from the Best Graduate Schools of Education rankings in 2022 and is currently listed as "unranked." (Id. at ¶ 58).

Beginning in 2013, U.S. News also published separate "publicly available" rankings for Best Online Education Programs. (Id. at ¶¶ 68, 89). Plaintiffs allege that, in these separate rankings of online programs, including those from which Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs base their claim on the Jones Day report, which USC voluntarily commissioned and made publicly available. Nothing in the Jones Day report—whether information, conclusion, or otherwise—provides any indication that the conduct discussed in the Jones Day report had any negative impact on the quality of the education provided by Rossier and received by Plaintiffs, or their post-graduation career prospects. Simply put, the Jones Day report does not support the notion that Plaintiffs were damaged or have a private cause of action. They were not, and they do not.

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graduated, Rossier's online program always ranked "below a number of state schools," made a "poor showing," or was entirely outside the reported rankings. (Id. at ¶ 68). Plaintiffs, all former online students, do not allege USC misreported any data for the Best Online Education Programs rankings.

Plaintiffs II.

Iola Favell alleges that, after graduating from the University of Alabama in 2019, she "planned to return to California to begin her teaching career and to pursue a master's degree." (Id. at ¶¶ 102, 104). Favell allegedly "became interested in USC Rossier because it was ranked highly (number 12)" in U.S. News's 2021 rankings for Best Graduate Schools of Education. (Id. at ¶ 105). In "or about the first part of 2020," Favell purportedly visited Rossier's website (rossier.usc.edu) and saw that the website "prominently displayed its US News [#12] ranking on its homepage." (Id. at ¶ 106). Displayed with equal prominence on this same website were statements that Rossier had four "faculty members among Education Week's top 200 scholars influencing education policy and practice," and that "91% of alums said their USC Rossier education prepared them to be more effective in their career." (Id.). Favell does not dispute the accuracy of these statements or suggest they were not appealing to her. Favell also does not allege that she saw any U.S. News ranking displayed on Rossier's website for online programs (rossieronline.usc.edu), or any other content that was misleading or inaccurate. Favell, nevertheless, asserts: "The US News rankings were the most important reason that [she] accepted the offer of admission to USC Rossier's online Master of Arts in Teaching (MAT) program." (Id. at ¶ 110). Favell allegedly began Rossier's online program in August 2020, graduated in May 2021, and currently works as a public elementary school teacher in Los Angeles. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 110-11).

Sue Zarnowski alleges that, after receiving her master's degree in 2012 from the University of New Haven and then holding "a variety of positions in the higher education space" for the next several years, she became interested in obtaining her doctorate via online classes. (Id. at ¶¶ 113-15). "In or around April of 2018,"

Mariah Cummings alleges that, after graduating from San Francisco State University in 2018, she decided to pursue an online master's degree in teaching. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 126, 128). In "or around the end of 2018 or the beginning of 2019," Cummings allegedly reviewed U.S News's 2018 rankings of Best Graduate Schools of Education and learned Rossier was ranked #10. (*Id.* at ¶ 129). Cummings purportedly visited Rossier's website (rossier.usc.edu) around the same time and saw that the website "prominently displayed its US News [#10] ranking on its homepage." (*Id.* at ¶ 130.). Displayed with equal prominence on this same website were statements that Rossier had five "faculty members among Education Week's top 200 scholars influencing educational policy and practice," and that Rossier had a "#4 2017 Diverse rank for

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conferring the most education doctoral degrees to students of color." (*Id.*). Cummings does not dispute the accuracy of these statements or suggest they were not appealing to her. Cummings alleges she "conducted at least one Google search to identify prestigious graduate education schools" around the same time, and "the paid search results advertised USC Rossier as a top-ranked school." (*Id.* at ¶ 131). Cummings, however, does not allege that she saw any U.S. News ranking displayed on Rossier's website for online programs (rossieronline.usc.edu), or that any advertisement specified any particular ranking for Rossier's online programs. Cummings, nevertheless, asserts: "The US News rankings were the most important reason that [she] accepted the offer of admission to USC Rossier's online Master of Arts in Teaching (MAT) program." (*Id.* at ¶ 133). Cummings purportedly began Rossier's online program in May 2019 and graduated in May 2021, though she does not plead her current employment status. (*Id.*).

Each Plaintiff alleges she now "regrets her decision to attend USC Rossier because of the false rankings information. She would not have attended had USC Rossier been ranked in a lower position ... and/or would not have paid nearly as much." (*Id.* at ¶¶ 112, 124, 134). No Plaintiff alleges USC ever promised her that Rossier would maintain a particular ranking in U.S. News's Best Graduate Schools of Education throughout her attendance, or that USC represented any particular ranking was included in exchange for the Plaintiff's payment of tuition and fees. No Plaintiff alleges USC agreed to charge less for tuition or fees if Rossier fell in such rankings during her attendance. Nor does any Plaintiff allege how Rossier's allegedly inflated ranking could have affected the quality of the education she received, or that Rossier's allegedly inflated ranking negatively impacted her post-graduation employment or salary.

III. The Claim

Plaintiffs assert one claim against USC for violations of the CLRA, which is based on USC's and Defendant 2U, Inc.'s ("2U") alleged promotion of Rossier's allegedly inflated U.S. News's Best Graduate Schools of Education rankings. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 147-53).

<u>LEGAL STANDARD</u>

"Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief." *Prime Healthcare Servs., Inc. v. Humana Ins. Co.*, 230 F. Supp. 3d 1194, 1202 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (quotations and brackets omitted). "If a complaint fails to do this, the defendant may move to dismiss it under Rule 12(b)(6)." *Id.* "Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must be dismissed when a plaintiff's allegations fail to set forth a set of facts that, if true, would entitle the complainant to relief." *Parents for Privacy v. Barr*, 949 F.3d 1210, 1221 (9th Cir. 2020). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." *Heimrich v. Dep't of the Army*, 947 F.3d 574, 577 (9th Cir. 2020) (quotations omitted). A complaint must "contain enough factual matter indicating plausible grounds for relief, not merely conceivable ones." *Banks v. N. Tr. Corp.*, 929 F.3d 1046, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2019) (quotations omitted).

ARGUMENT

I. Plaintiffs' Claim Fails Under the "Reasonable Consumer" Standard.

Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for relief because their allegations do not satisfy the "reasonable consumer" standard governing their CLRA claim. *See Becerra v. Dr Pepper/Seven Up, Inc.*, 945 F.3d 1225, 1228 (9th Cir. 2019). Representations "are only actionable ... if they are likely to deceive a reasonable consumer." *Stickrath v. Globalstar, Inc.*, 527 F. Supp. 2d 992, 998 (N.D. Cal. 2007). This standard "requires a probability that a significant portion of ... targeted consumers, *acting reasonably in the circumstances*, could be misled." *Becerra*, 945 F.3d at 1228-29 (emphasis added).

While Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint is filled with a number of alleged statements or representations from USC, very few are relevant to their claim and actually at issue. This is because the CLRA has "independent requirements for standing, which mandate allegations of actual reliance." *Guzman v. Polaris Indus., Inc.*, No. 8:19-CV-01543, 2020 WL 2477684, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2020). So, a plaintiff

must "plead 'actual reliance' on the alleged misrepresentation." *Id.* There can be no actual reliance when the plaintiff never saw or heard the alleged representation. *Id.*; *see also*, *e.g.*, *Antonyan v. Ford Motor Co.*, No. CV-21-0945, 2022 WL 1299964, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2022). Plaintiffs do not allege to have seen or heard, let alone relied on, most of the alleged representations identified in their First Amended Complaint. (*See* FAC, ¶¶ 77, 79-87). These alleged representations, not relied on by Plaintiffs, should be disregarded. *See Guzman*, 2020 WL 2477684, at *3.

Plaintiffs identify only a handful of representations that they allegedly saw and relied on in choosing to enroll in Rossier's online programs:

- (1) U.S. News's Best Graduate Schools of Education rankings for 2018 (Cummings) and 2021 (Favell) (FAC, ¶¶ 105, 129);
- (2) the homepage for Rossier's website (rossier.usc.edu) displaying Rossier's ranking in U.S. News's Best Graduate Schools of Education for 2018 (Zarnowski and Cummings) and 2021 (Favell) (*Id.* at ¶¶ 106, 117, 130); and
- (3) internet advertisements in 2018 or 2019 stating Rossier was "ranked as a Top 10 graduate school" or "top ranked" (Zarnowski and Cummings) (*Id.* at ¶¶ 116, 118, 131).³

According to Plaintiffs, the "[s]pecific misrepresentations and omissions on which the Plaintiffs relied are as follows: Iola Favell (Paragraphs 105-108, 110), Sue Zarnowski (Paragraphs 115-121), and Mariah Cummings (Paragraphs 129-32)." (*Id.* at ¶ 150). The only allegations of omission included in those cited paragraphs concern an alleged failure to disclose advisors' affiliations with 2U. (*Id.* at ¶¶ 107, 119). Unlike the rankings issue, however, there is no allegation any Plaintiff would have declined to attend Rossier, or would have paid less to attend, had she known about the allegedly omitted affiliations with 2U. Further, "for a fraud by omission claim under California's consumer protection laws, the omitted fact must relate to the central functionality of the product [or service]" rather than a plaintiff's "subjective preferences." *Hall v. SeaWorld Entm't, Inc.*, 747 Fed. App'x 449, 451 (9th Cir. 2018) (quotations omitted). Plaintiffs do not plead any omission (relied on or otherwise) that relates to the central functionality—as opposed to Plaintiffs' subjective preferences—of their education. *See id.*

Plaintiffs' claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief because, as a matter of law, no reasonable consumer in this context would be misled by these representations, in that: (1) they are mere opinion or puffery; and (2) college graduates interested in online education programs, acting reasonably under the circumstances, would not select a school solely or primarily because of U.S. News's subjective ranking of the school, particularly when there were separate U.S. News rankings specifically applicable to online education programs.

A. Plaintiffs rely on mere opinion or puffery.

Plaintiffs' claim is based on non-actionable opinion or puffery not relied on by reasonable consumers. "Puffery is a general claim of superiority or exaggeration which is expressed in broad, vague or commendatory language." *In re Century 21-RE/MAX Real Estate Advert. Claims Litig.*, 882 F. Supp. 915, 926 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (quotations omitted). "Puffery is distinguishable from misdescription or false representations of specific characteristics of a product." *Id.* (quotations omitted). A representation "which merely states in general terms that one product is superior, or that a product's attribute is far superior to that of other products, constitutes puffery and is not actionable." *Knowles v. ARRIS Int'l PLC*, 847 Fed. App'x 512, 513 (9th Cir. 2021) (quotations omitted). For example, "better than" statements are "the most innocuous form" of puffery. *TYR Sport Inc. v. Warnaco Swimwear Inc.*, 679 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1137 (C.D. Cal. 2009).

"According to California law, a party cannot be held liable for falsity on the basis of 'mere puffing,' *i.e.* merely for making statements of opinion." *Bezirganyan v. BMW of N. Am., LLC*, 562 F. Supp. 3d 633, 643 (C.D. Cal. 2021). "Statements of this kind cannot ground liability for falsity because no reasonable consumer would be inclined to think of them as statements of fact, rather than as statements of opinion." *Id.* Whether "an alleged representation is a statement of fact or is instead mere puffery is a legal question that may be resolved on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion." *Newcal Indus., Inc. v. Ikon Office Sol.*, 513 F.3d 1038, 1053 (9th Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted).

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U.S. News's rankings of Best Graduate Schools of Education are simply U.S. News's subjective opinions regarding which schools are superior or "better than" other schools—not representations of specific facts about the schools. *See TYR Sport*, 679 F. Supp. 2d at 1137. These rankings are "classic, non-actionable opinions." *See Ariix*, *LLC v. NutriSearch Corp.*, 985 F.3d 1107, 1121 (9th Cir. 2021) (quotations omitted).

In Ariix, a nutritional supplement company ("Ariix") brought a false advertising claim against NutriSearch, the publisher of a guide "that compares and reviews nutritional supplements" in part "using a five-star rating system based on 18 criteria." *Id.* at 1111-13. Ariix alleged the guide's ratings were rigged to favor Ariix's competitor. *Id.* The Ninth Circuit, however, held that the "comparative five-star ratings in the Guide are not actionable" because the ratings "are simply statements of opinion about the relative quality of various nutritional supplement products." Id. at 1121. The Ninth Circuit flatly rejected Ariix's argument that the ratings were representations of fact merely "because the Guide purports to rely on scientific and objective criteria." *Id.* In doing so, the Ninth Circuit offered a very notable analogy: "[T]here is an inherently subjective element in deciding which scientific and objective criteria to consider. For example, publications that rank colleges or law schools purportedly rely on objective criteria (e.g., acceptance rates, test scores, class size, endowment), but selecting those criteria involves subjective decision-making." Id. (emphasis added). In other words, the five-star ratings were no different than the non-actionable opinion-based school rankings, such as U.S. News's Best Graduate Schools of Education rankings. *Id.*⁴

Any alleged displays of those rankings by USC, either on the Rossier website or via internet advertising, are nothing more than a repetition of U.S. News's opinions,

⁴ See also, e.g., Aviation Charter, Inc. v. Aviation Research Grp./US, 416 F.3d 864, 871 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding comparative rating based on "subjective interpretation of multiple objective data points" was "not a provably false statement of fact") (quotations omitted); ZL Techs., Inc. v. Gartner, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 2d 789, 798 (N.D. Cal. 2010) ("The use of a rigorous mathematical model to generate a ranking of software companies based upon this subjective data does not transform Gartner's opinion into a statement of fact that can be proved or disproved.").

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based on U.S. News's subjective criteria, that Rossier is superior or "better than" other schools—not representations of specific facts about Rossier. "Alleged statements regarding the quality of academic advising, the quality of education, the program's convenience and simplicity for working adults, or increased earning potential, are not actionable representations of fact for purposes of fraud or misrepresentation." Fowler v. Univ. of Phoenix, Inc., No. 18-CV-1544, No. 2019 WL 1746576, at *12 (S.D. Cal. April 18, 2019). "Instead, they are boasts, all-but-meaningless superlatives ... which no reasonable consumer would take as anything more weighty than an advertising slogan." Id.; see also, e.g., In re SAIC, Inc. Secs. Litig., No. 12-Civ-1353, 2013 WL 5462289, at *12-*13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2013) (ruling that references in shareholder reports to company's high ranking on "Fortune's list of the World's Most Admired Companies"—a ranking which the company allegedly knew was not accurate-"amount to inactionable puffery"); Century 21-RE/MAX, 882 F. Supp. at 928 (ruling allegedly false assertions that RE/MAX is "#1 in the United States—and the World" and "the No. 1 position RE/MAX is now widely thought to hold in the United States" were non-actionable as "mere opinion" or "classic puffery").

Accordingly, Plaintiffs' claim should be dismissed because no "reasonable consumer" can or would rely on the subjective, opinion-based U.S. News rankings or USC's alleged puffery boasting about those rankings.

B. College graduates, acting reasonably, would not place undue importance on the rankings.

Even if the rankings and related representations relied on by Plaintiffs were not mere opinion or puffery (which they are), the target consumers, *acting reasonably under the circumstances*, would not rely on the representations. Courts have granted motions to dismiss CLRA claims "on the basis that the alleged representations were not false, misleading, or deceptive as a matter of law." *Robie v. Trader Joe's Co.*, No. 20-CV-07355, 2021 WL 2548960, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2021).

The "target consumers" of Rossier's online master's and doctoral programs (the only Rossier programs at issue) were college graduates. "By anyone's definition, reasonable consumers—college graduates—seriously considering [graduate] schools are a sophisticated subset of education consumers, capable of sifting through data and weighing alternatives before making a decision regarding their post-college options, such as applying for [graduate] school." *Gomez-Jimenez v. N.Y. Law Sch.*, 943 N.Y.S.2d 834, 843 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012). "These reasonable consumers have available to them any number of sources of information to review when making their decisions." *Id.*

Reasonable consumers in this context, therefore, would not place the undue importance on U.S. News's rankings that Plaintiffs allege they did. (FAC, ¶¶ 110, 120, 133). In addition to being a single source of information,⁵ U.S. News's rankings "are notoriously questionable." *Rhine v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago*, No. 96-C-4125, 1998 WL 456550, at *3 n.4 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 1998); *see also Ransom v. M. Patel Enters., Inc.*, 859 F. Supp. 2d 856, 860 (W.D. Tex. 2012) (describing U.S. News's rankings as "an arbitrary and relatively unpersuasive source"). Plaintiffs even acknowledge U.S. News's rankings have been "plagued" with "fraud scandals." (FAC, ¶ 94). Further, a "reasonable person would understand that two people looking at the same underlying data could come up with vastly different [rankings] depending on their *subjective views* of what is relevant and what is important." *ZL Techs.*, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 798 (quotations omitted).

⁵ Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint seems to suggest that U.S. News's rankings are the only rankings available to prospective graduate students. This is not the case. For example, graduate school programs are also ranked by The Higher Education (https://www.timeshighereducation.com/student/best-universities/best-universities-education-degrees); and College Factual (https://www.collegefactual.com/majors/education/rankings/best-graduate-schools/masters-degrees/). On a motion to dismiss, this Court may consider matters subject to judicial notice. *Mendoza v. Amalgamated Transit Union Int'l*, 30 F. 4th 879, 884 (9th Cir. 2022). Such matters include the existence of these other rankings. *See Hologram USA Inc. v. Arena3d Indus. Illusions LLC*, No. CV-14-03072, 2014 WL 12560619, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 23, 2014).

 But even if the target consumers do place such importance on the rankings, they are still expected to act reasonably under the circumstances. *Becerra*, 945 F.3d at 1228-29. That means a college-educated person looking at online graduate schools "may be reasonably expected to perform some due diligence that goes beyond glancing at" a "self-serving" ranking listed on a school's website or advertisement. *Casey v. Fla. Coastal Sch. of Law, Inc.*, No. 3:14-CV-1229, 2015 WL 10096084, at *15 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 11, 2015).

Here, a reasonable prospective online student would not ignore U.S. News's separate, equally public rankings for Best Online Education Programs, especially if U.S. News's rankings are claimed to be particularly important to the student. Plaintiffs allege that U.S. News released *separate* and "publicly available" rankings for Best Online Education Programs, including rankings for 2018 and 2021 (the years of the Best Graduate Schools of Education rankings allegedly relied on by Plaintiffs). (FAC, ¶ 68, 89). Plaintiffs also allege that, in the separate Best Online Education Programs rankings, Rossier did not crack the top 60 for the 2018 rankings or the top 40 for the 2021 rankings. (*Id.* at ¶ 68). If Plaintiffs were as myopically focused on school rankings as they allege, it strains credulity that they would not have looked deeper into the ranking that pertained to the program they were contemplating. "One would think that reasonable consumers, armed with the publicly available information from *US News* that [P]laintiffs cite, thus would avail themselves of [P]laintiffs' own logic as stated in their complaint" and check the separate U.S. News rankings that specifically applied to online programs. *See Gomez-Jimenez*, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 844.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs' claim should be dismissed because target consumers acting reasonably under these circumstances, *i.e.*, college graduates doing their due diligence in choosing a university at which to pursue a post-graduate education in an online modality, would not singularly or primarily rely on U.S. News's rankings of Best Graduate Schools of Education, particularly given the existence of U.S. News's separate annual rankings for Best Online Education Programs and Rossier's alleged lower-to-

non-existent showing in those separate rankings. *See Gomez-Jimenez*, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 856-57 (dismissing claims brought by law school graduates alleging they relied on school's misleading representations regarding employment prospects because the representations were not misleading to a reasonable consumer).

II. Plaintiffs Fail to Plead an Economic Injury-in-Fact.

Plaintiffs' claim also fails because Plaintiffs cannot plead an economic injury-infact, which is required to establish statutory standing under the CLRA. *Charbonnet v. Omni Hotels & Resorts*, No. 20-CV-01777, 2020 WL 7385828, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2020). "The Ninth Circuit has recognized that statutory standing is a question of merits rather than subject matter jurisdiction and is properly analyzed under Rule 12(b)(6)." *Id.* at *5 n.6.

To "establish economic injury-in-fact, a plaintiff must show that by relying on a misrepresentation[,] they paid more for a product than they otherwise would have paid or bought it when they otherwise would not have done so." *Id.* (quotations and ellipses omitted). This is essentially a theory that the plaintiff lost the benefit of her bargain. *See Jackson v. Loews Hotels, Inc.*, No. CV-18-827, 2019 WL 6721637, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2019). While "overpayment" (or lost benefit of the bargain) is a "theoretically cognizable" economic injury-in-fact, "a plaintiff must still plead facts sufficient to establish" such injury-in-fact. *Makaryan v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc.*, No. CV-17-5086, 2017 WL 6888254, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2017).

Here, each Plaintiff asserts she would not have attended Rossier, or would have paid less to attend, if Rossier had accurately "been ranked in a lower position" than the #10 ranking (Zarnowski and Cummings) or #12 ranking (Favell) that she saw. (FAC, ¶¶ 112, 124, 134). This alleged injury should be rejected as insufficient to establish statutory standing because it is conclusory and not plausible—both as to bargain and benefit—as well as contrary to common sense.

A. Plaintiffs' alleged overpayment is conclusory and unsupported, in that there is no allegation they bargained for any particular ranking.

A plaintiff fails to plead injury based on lost benefit of the bargain when there is no allegation that the defendant "made any affirmative representation that [the supposed benefit] was included in the cost of the goods" or service. *Gardiner v. Walmart, Inc.*, No. 20-CV-04618, 2021 WL 4992539, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2021). In such a case, the plaintiff did not bargain for the supposed benefit. *See id*.

Plaintiffs here make no allegation that USC affirmatively represented that any particular U.S. News ranking, the supposed "benefit," would be included in the cost of Plaintiffs' online educations at Rossier. Of course, USC could not guarantee Plaintiffs they would receive an education from the #10 or #12 ranked school (or any other ranking) in exchange for paying tuition and fees, as the rankings are issued by a third-party, not USC, and are always subject to annual change. Further, Plaintiffs make no allegation that USC affirmatively represented that it would charge less for tuition or fees if Rossier fell in U.S. News's rankings during Plaintiffs' attendance. Plaintiffs, therefore, fail to plead a cognizable economic injury-in-fact because they plead no facts suggesting they actually bargained for the "benefit" they purportedly lost. *See id.* at *5-*6. For this reason alone, their claim should be dismissed for lack of statutory standing.

B. Plaintiffs' alleged overpayment is conclusory and unsupported, in that there are no facts showing a lost benefit.

Even more revealing, Plaintiffs also plead no facts showing they actually lost any benefit at all, let alone one for which they bargained. In *Cahen v. Toyota Motor Corp.*, 717 Fed. App'x 720, 722-23 (9th Cir. 2017), the plaintiffs brought a CLRA claim on the basis that they were deceived into buying vehicles with an undisclosed vulnerability to being hacked. Though their vehicles had not actually been hacked, the plaintiffs alleged "they suffered an injury because they either would not have purchased their vehicles or would have paid less for them had they known about these hacking risks." *Id.* The Ninth Circuit held this alleged injury was "not credible," as the plaintiffs "only

made conclusory allegations that their cars are worth less." *Id.* at 723-24. The Ninth Circuit noted the "plaintiffs have not, for example, alleged a demonstrable effect on the market for their specific vehicles based on documented recalls or declining Kelley Bluebook values." *Id.* at 723 (quotations omitted).

Similarly, in *Beyer v. Symantec Corp.*, the plaintiffs brought a CLRA claim on the basis that they were deceived into buying software with undisclosed security vulnerabilities. No. 18-CV-02006, 2019 WL 935135, at *1, *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2019). Though they had not suffered any actual hacking, the plaintiffs alleged that, but for the defendant's misrepresentations and omissions, they would not have bought the software or would have paid substantially less for it. *Id.* at *3. The district court rejected the plaintiffs' "bare assertion that they overpaid for the" software, noting the plaintiffs did "not allege that disclosure of the alleged defects had a demonstrable effect on the market for the" software. *Id.* at *4 (quotations omitted). In the absence of such allegations, the plaintiffs' alleged injury was "not credible, as the allegations that the [software is] worth less are conclusory and unsupported by any facts." *Id.* (quotations omitted).

Like the plaintiffs in *Cahen* and *Beyer*, Plaintiffs here make only a bare assertion that their education is worth less than they paid because Rossier's ranking was not accurate. (*See* FAC, ¶¶ 76, 150(d)). But Plaintiffs do not explain how or why U.S. News's subjective rankings impact tuition cost or the inherent value of their education or degrees. There are no (nor could there credibly be any) allegations that Plaintiffs could have somehow paid less tuition for their Rossier education if the U.S. News rankings were different. There are no factual allegations showing the alleged rankings issue has had any "demonstrable effect" on the market for Rossier degrees. *Cf. Cahen*, 717 Fed. App'x at 723; *Beyer*, 2019 WL 935135, at *4. And there is no allegation that any Plaintiff was unable to obtain a particular job, or that any Plaintiff is earning a lower salary, because of Rossier's allegedly inflated ranking. There are also no factual allegations showing how Rossier's allegedly inflated ranking could have lessened the

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quality of the education that Plaintiffs received. A third-party ranking—whether "true" or not—has no impact on what Plaintiffs were taught at Rossier, how they were taught at Rossier, or whether Rossier succeeded in effectively preparing them for a career in education.

Accordingly, like Cahen and Beyer, Plaintiffs' alleged injury of overpayment is not credible. Plaintiffs' bare assertion that they lost their alleged "benefit" because their education is somehow worth less is conclusory and unsupported by any facts. Plaintiffs, therefore, fail to sufficiently allege the economic injury-in-fact necessary for statutory standing and their claim should be dismissed.

Plaintiffs' alleged overpayment is contrary to common sense. C.

Plaintiffs' alleged injury of overpayment should also be rejected as contrary to common sense. "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., 838 F.3d 958, 963 (9th Cir. 2016) (quotations omitted) (emphasis added).

Again, Plaintiffs contend they would not have attended Rossier, or would not have paid as much to attend, if Rossier had "been ranked in a lower position." (FAC, ¶¶ 112, 124, 134). Essentially, Plaintiffs allege they overpaid because they paid to attend a school that was ranked #10 or #12 (depending on the Plaintiff), but that ranking was inflated and not accurate. As a matter of common sense, though, a student cannot overpay based on an inaccurate ranking because a student cannot, and does not, actually pay for any particular ranking in the first place—rather, they pay for an education.

U.S. News's rankings are issued by U.S. News, not USC, and they are always subject to annual change, including due to circumstances out of USC's control (e.g., if schools behind Rossier improve their relevant statistics enough to pass Rossier or if U.S. News tweaks its formula in a manner unfavorable to Rossier). The rankings are

also based on *past* data and are thus necessarily *backward* looking;⁶ they are not future projections, let alone promises, of any ranking a school may have throughout a student's future attendance. The mere fact that Rossier was ranked #10 or #12 prior to Plaintiffs enrolling provided no guarantee it would maintain those rankings throughout Plaintiffs' attendance, nor do Plaintiffs allege otherwise. Undeniably, there was always the risk that Rossier would drop in the rankings after Plaintiffs enrolled and Plaintiffs thus would not receive an education from a #10 or #12 ranked school, regardless of whether or not that ranking was ever accurate. Plaintiffs, accordingly, could not and did not pay USC for a #10 or #12 ranking.

This situation is very similar to *Phillips v. DePaul University*, 19 N.E.3d 1019 (Ill. App. 2014). In *Phillips*, graduates of DePaul's law school sued the university, alleging "that DePaul's employment information for the 2005, 2007, and 2009 classes was 'incomplete, false and materially misleading' in that the employment rate of its graduates within nine months of graduation was 'substantially overstated.'" *Id.* at 1024. The plaintiffs alleged "they each relied on the employment information for the 2005, 2007, and 2009 classes when choosing to apply to, enroll, and continue to be enrolled in DePaul." *Id.* at 1025. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims, explaining they failed to identify any injury:

[T]he employment and salary statistics listed in the employment information for the 2005, 2007, and 2009 classes consisted of generalized, historical averages for those particular classes and did not constitute any type of promise or projection for the individual plaintiffs here; thus, even assuming for the sake of argument that the employment information for

⁶ According to Plaintiffs, "The Best Education School rankings are published annually, typically in March, *using data collected for the academic year that begins the prior fall*. Each edition, however, uses the following calendar year in its title. For example, US News published the '2021' rankings in March of 2020 using data collected in the fall of 2019 for those students enrolled during the fall 2019 semester." (FAC, ¶ 54) (emphasis added).

the 2005, 2007, and 2009 classes did not recite DePaul's "true" postgraduation employment statistics for those classes, plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead how they were damaged thereby given that these statistics did not apply to plaintiffs or make any promises or projections regarding their future employment and salary prospects.

Id. at 1035.

Like the employment information in *Phillips*, the rankings here were based on past data, did not apply to Plaintiffs (as they were necessarily subject to change after Plaintiffs enrolled), and "did not constitute any type of promise or projection" for Plaintiffs. *See id.* Thus, "even assuming for the sake of argument" that Rossier's rankings were inaccurate and should have been lower, Plaintiffs fail "to adequately plead how they were damaged thereby." *Id.*

In short, Plaintiffs could not pay for, did not pay for, and had no entitlement to, a particular ranking, as their theory of overpayment suggests. Rather, they paid for an education—which they admittedly received—and could not have suffered injury merely because that education allegedly was not from a "true" #10 or #12 ranked school (assuming such a ranking could ever be "true"). *See id.* This Court should, therefore, dismiss Plaintiffs' claim for lack of statutory standing because their alleged injury based on a mere third-party ranking is contrary to common sense.

III. Plaintiffs' Claim is Barred by the Educational Malpractice Doctrine.

Finally, Plaintiffs do not state a claim for relief because their claim is barred by the educational malpractice doctrine. "Courts in California and across the country have repeatedly rejected claims that seek damages for an allegedly 'subpar' education, or 'educational malpractice' claims, whether those claims sound in contract or tort." *Lindner v. Occidental College*, No. CV-20-8481, 2020 WL 7350212, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2020). Under the educational malpractice doctrine, a court will not entertain claims that "would require the Court to make judgments about the quality and value of the education" that a university provides to a student. *Id.* at *7. Thus, if a plaintiff

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makes a claim that a university failed "to provide him with an education of a certain quality"—as opposed to failed to deliver on a specific promise—that claim is barred by the educational malpractice doctrine. *Saroya v. Univ. of the Pac.*, 503 F. Supp. 3d 986, 995 (N.D. Cal. 2020).

Such is the case here. There is no allegation that USC breached any specific promise to provide a particular service. Instead, Plaintiffs' claim is based on the allegation that USC "misled prospective students into believing that they were applying to online programs that were more competitive and higher quality than in reality." (FAC, ¶ 76) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs allege they paid "tuition at an inflated price" because Rossier's ranking was not accurate and should have been lower. (Id. at ¶ 150(d)). As discussed above, these allegations of injury are not credible. But even if they were, Plaintiffs are undoubtedly making a claim that USC failed to provide Plaintiffs "with an education of a certain quality," i.e., one commensurate with a #10 or #12 ranking—which is a claim that would "require the Court to make judgments about the quality and value of the education" that Plaintiffs received at Rossier. See Saroya, 503 F. Supp. 3d at 995; Lindner, 2020 WL 7350212, at *7. Plaintiffs are essentially asking this Court to determine whether Rossier truly was the tenth or twelfth best school. Such a determination is not only practically impossible, but legally prohibited. See Linder, 2020 WL 7350212, at *7. Plaintiffs' claim, resting on the notion that they somehow received a lower quality or less valuable education, should be dismissed as barred by the educational malpractice doctrine. See id.

CONCLUSION

For any or all of the foregoing reasons, this Court should dismiss Plaintiffs' claim against USC.

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